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Abstract  
We investigate the impacts of a significant area-based intervention (LEGI) that aimed to 
increase employment and entrepreneurial activity in 30 disadvantaged areas across England. 
We examine the spatial pattern of effects at a fine spatial scale using panel data for small 
geographic units and a regression discontinuity design that exploits the programme eligibility 
rule. The results indicate considerable local displacement effects. Employment increases in 
treated areas close to the treatment area boundary at the cost of significant employment losses 
in untreated localities just across the boundary. These differences vanish quickly when 
moving away from the boundary and do not persist after the programme is abolished. These 
findings support the view that area-based interventions may have considerable negative 
displacement effects on untreated parts of the economy. This displacement can substantially 
reduce (or in this case eliminate) any net benefits. 
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1 Introduction 
Many governments target large amounts of public spending at areas experiencing high 
unemployment and poor economic performance. Regional policy accounts for around 35 percent of 
total community spending in the EU (EU, 2013) and many national governments in Europe run 
extensive regional programs targeted at disadvantaged areas. In the US, around $95 billion is spent 
annually on spatially targeted economic development programs by federal and state governments 
(Kline & Moretti, forthcoming). Despite the prevalence of these policies, a common concern among 
economists is that they merely shift economic activity from one place to another without any 
aggregate net benefits. While a number of studies have examined the direct impacts of such 
policies, these displacement effects are still poorly understood. 
We study the impacts of a significant area-based intervention that aimed to increase employment 
and entrepreneurial activity in disadvantaged areas in England, with a specific focus on identifying 
spillover effects of the programme on untreated locations. The Local Enterprise Growth Initiative 
(LEGI) spent 418 million pounds on 30 deprived areas during the period 2006-2011 (DCLG, 
2010b). Eligibility for the program was based on a deprivation index rank rule: an eligible area had 
to rank 50th or below against at least one of a set of pre-determined deprivation indices. We use 
these features of the programme to identify the causal effects on employment, net business creation 
and unemployment. Using data at a fine spatial scale, we find local displacement of jobs within 1 
kilometre of the boundary of treatment areas. There are no statistically distinguishable differences 
between the performance of treatment and control locations further from the boundary. Moreover, 
our results suggest that improved employment in boundary treatment areas is offset by a drop in 
employment in the nearby untreated areas implying net effects that are much smaller than 
aggregate. We present evidence that suggests these effects are unlikely to persist much beyond the 
end of the programme. In contrast to these temporary displacement effects on employment, we find 
little, if any, effect at all on number of businesses. Finally, consistent with the fact that employment 
effects occur at a scale that is smaller than the local labour market, we find no effect on 
unemployment of local residents. 
The common criticism of the effectiveness of spatially targeted policies relies on the argument that 
in competitive labour and property markets spatially-targeted support is offset by increases in rents 
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(e.g. Muth, 1969; Roback, 1982).3 Our empirical results can be explained by appealing to the fact 
that, in the UK, commercial rental contracts typically cover a five-year fixed term which implies 
sticky price adjustment and incomplete capitalization in the short-run (Crosby et al, 2003). As a 
result, subsidies targeted to specific areas may induce (short-run) spatial reallocation of economic 
activity towards supported areas. Because similar businesses that are located close to each other 
often compete in the same local product or service markets, effects of the programme would be 
more likely to spillover to an untreated area the closer it is to the treatment area boundary. In 
addition to these effects operating through local product market competition, labour market effects 
may be larger for untreated locations closer to treated areas as a result of either commuting costs 
(e.g., Zenou, 2009) or local hiring networks (e.g., Topa, 2001; Ioannides and Loury, 2004). 
This paper contributes to the literature concerned with displacement effects of economic policy 
interventions (Heckman et al, 1998; Blundell et al, 2004). While a growing literature has examined 
displacement effects within local labour markets in the context of active labour market programmes 
(e.g. Gautier et al, 2012; Crépon, et. al. 2013; Ferracci et al, 2014), convincing evidence of spillover 
effects of business support interventions across treatment area boundaries is scarce. Hanson and 
Rohlin (2013) suggests that areas that border US Empowerment Zones (EZ) experienced a decline 
in employment and net business creation compared to areas that border rejected EZ applicants, 
which could indicate negative displacement of economic activity across the treatment area 
boundary.4 In contrast, Ham et al (2011) find no evidence of displacement effects of three US place-
based programmes when comparing a set of nearest ineligible Census Tracts (contiguous to the 
treatment area) to a set of second nearest ineligible Census Tracts (i.e. ineligible Tracts that are 
contiguous to the set of nearest ineligible Tracts). In a study on the long-term impacts of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, Kline and Moretti (2014) report results based on comparisons between 
counties adjacent to the TVA area and other ineligible counties, but find no indication of local 
spillovers at the TVA boundary. Finally, at a larger spatial scale, Gobillon et al (2012) find no 
3 For a discussion of the cases in which spatially-targeted economic interventions may be economically efficient, see 
e.g. Greenstone and Looney (2010) and Kline and Moretti (2013, forthcoming). 
4 In a related study, Givord et al (2013) compare buffers around French enterprise zones that were granted a business 
tax exemption to observably similar buffers around areas that were in a pool of candidate enterprise zones but were 
not selected. Their matching approach suggests that the growth rate in the number of establishments was lower 
within buffers around treated areas compared to buffers around untreated areas, but they find no similar effects on 
employment. Mayer et al (forthcoming) arrive at a similar conclusion when comparing narrowly defined ZFU areas to 
non-ZFU areas within the same municipality and further away. See also the study by Hanson and Rohlin (2011) 
suggesting increasing share of industries that were expected to have the largest gains from tax incentives in 
Empowerment Zones compared to Enterprise Communities, which may indicate displacement of economic activity 
across sectors. Finally, a related strand of literature that examines R&D spillovers finds evidence of business stealing 
effects (e.g. Bloom et al, 2013). 
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evidence of displacement between treatment and control municipalities located within five 
kilometres. Likewise, Criscuolo et al (2012) find no evidence of displacement effects for the UK 
Regional Selective Assistance program when looking at Travel to Work Areas.  
Our approach for identifying displacement effects builds on the previous literature to evaluate the 
impact of place-based policy interventions using fine-resolution spatial data (e.g. Neumark and 
Kolko, 2010).5 While previous literature on spatial spillover effects has focused on ineligible areas 
that border treatment areas, we examine the distribution of changes in the outcomes of interest over 
a wide spatial range by splitting treatment and control areas into one-km-wide zones based on the 
distance from the treatment area boundary. This approach allows for identifying displacement 
effects in local markets around treatment boundaries, provided that spillovers weaken sufficiently 
quickly as the distance between treated and untreated locations increases.  This proves to be the 
case as we find displacement of employment from narrow control zones to treatment zones at the 
boundary, while the effects diminish quickly as we move away from the boundary. 
The usefulness of comparing nearby treated and untreated locations depends on the extent to which 
unobserved area characteristics affecting the outcomes vary smoothly across space. If variation is 
smooth, reducing the distance between treated and control areas alleviates concerns about 
potentially confounding unobserved differences in the absence of treatment (Duranton et al, 2011). 
However, while high-resolution spatial data allows for comparisons between very closely located 
areas at the treatment boundary, crossing such a boundary may change unobserved policy factors, if 
it separates administrative units that carry out independent local policies (as is the case in our 
application based on local authority boundaries).  
Some reassurance on this point, comes from the fact that trends between treatment and control 
zones near to the LEGI boundary are similar in the period preceding the implementation of the 
programme. In order to lend further credibility to our results, we exploit the discontinuity in the rule 
determining whether an area is eligible to apply for LEGI funding. According to this rule, a local 
authority (LA) is eligible to apply for funding if it ranks 50th or worse against at least one of twelve 
pre-determined measures of deprivation. We exploit this institutional restriction to identify the 
causal impact of the policy for a population of treated and untreated areas just above and below the 
5 Earlier contributions include Dabney (1991); Papke (1993, 1994); Boarnet and Bogart (1996); Bondonio and Engberg 
(2000); Peters and Fisher (2002); O’Keefe (2004); Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007); Hanson (2009). Bartik (1991) and 
Nolan and Wong (2004) provide reviews.   
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eligibility threshold. Identification using this discontinuity requires that LAs near the threshold were 
unable to manipulate their deprivation rank and eligibility status. This is likely to be the case 
because deprivation ranks determining eligibility were based on data pre-dating the announcement 
of the programme. We show that there is no abnormal bunching of LAs at the eligibility threshold 
and conduct several robustness tests to validate our approach. 
The unintended displacement of economic activity across the treatment area boundary is especially 
relevant in the context of narrowly targeted place-based renewal policies, because the negatively 
affected nearby neighbourhoods are typically also among the most disadvantaged areas. Thus the 
impact of policy is simply to shuffle employment from one deprived area to another. Displacement 
across treatment area boundaries also has important implications for the interpretation of evaluation 
strategies commonly used to consider the effects of spatially targeted programs. First, if the impact 
of the treatment spillover to nearby untreated areas, using areas close to the treatment area as a 
control group yields misleading estimates of the impact of the programme. Second, even if 
treatment areas were randomly assigned to treatment, comparisons between treatment and control 
areas which are further apart and thus unlikely to be affected by local displacement effects will 
provide biased estimates of the net effects of the intervention if spillovers to nearby areas are not 
taken into account.6 Our approach utilising detailed spatial data suggests one approach for 
addressing this problem.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides more details of the LEGI 
programme. Section 3 describes our data while section 4 describes our identification strategy and 
section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Institutional Setting 
The Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI), introduced by the British government in 2006, 
aimed “to release the productivity and economic potential of the most deprived local areas through 
enterprise and investment, thereby boosting local incomes and employment opportunities.” (DCLG, 
2010a). The three key objectives of the programme were to i) increase entrepreneurial activity in 
deprived areas ii) support growth and reduce exit rates among local businesses in deprived areas, 
6 A further concern is general equilibrium effects at a more aggregate geographic level identification of which is out of 
the scope of this study. However, our empirical approach will detect local displacement effects even if wider-area 
general equilibrium effects are simultaneously at work. 
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and iii) attract investment into deprived areas. The primary aim of LEGI funding was to increase 
resources and develop existing schemes supporting these objectives (HM Treasury, 2006).    
91 deprived LAs in England were eligible to bid for LEGI funding. These were areas that were 
receiving funds from an existing programme – Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) – at the time 
LEGI was announced in July 2005, and any areas that were named eligible for the 2006-2008 
allocation of the NRF.7 In order to be eligible, an LA had to rank 50th or worst against any of six 
LA-level indices of multiple deprivation (IMD) in 2000 or 2004. The LA-level IMDs were 
constructed by the central government using a complex three step procedure based on a number of 
LSOA-level variables pre-dating the introduction of LEGI, some of which dated back as far as the 
1991 Census (Appendix A provides details of the construction of these indices). 
Selection of treatment areas from the pool of eligible LAs was based on LA proposals detailing the 
way in which they planned to achieve the objectives of the initiative. To support their proposals, 
LAs were expected to provide evidence of the level of deprivation in their area and the gaps in local 
provision of public services supporting business (HM Treasury 2006). 279 million pounds of LEGI 
funding covering three years was allocated in the first two competitive bidding rounds held in 
February and December 2006 with funding awarded to 20 LEGI areas comprising 30 LAs displayed 
in figure 1 (some LEGI areas involved joint bids with the largest awarded joint initiative consisting 
of five LAs) (DCLG, 2010a). Projects under the scheme were expected to operate with a ten year 
time horizon. In the end, the programme ran for 6 years with the initiative abolished from March 
2011 following a change of government. By the abolition of the programme, the total spending on 
assistance had reached 418 million pounds. Spending was at its highest level in 2008 and 2009 with 
around 100 million pounds spent annually.8 With resident working age populations of around 1.4 
million, 234,000 unemployed, and 85,000 businesses in 2006, per year allocation of LEGI funding 
was around £71 per capita, £427 per unemployed, and £1,176 per business in these years.  
Due to the LA-specific design, the mix of support activities differed quite significantly by area. 
Across the programme as a whole about 30% of expenditure went on supporting existing local 
7 At the time, the NRF was the major funding stream used to try to tackle deprivation in England's poorest 
neighbourhoods. In contrast to LEGI, with its clear economic focus, NRF had much wider objectives with about 20% of 
expenditure targeted at crime, 20% on education (school and pre-school provision), 13% on employment, 15% on 
health, 7% on housing and physical environment and 7% on transport (with the remainder spent on miscellaneous 
other local priorities and administration). See DCLG (2008) for more details of the NRF programme. 
8 The annual allocation figures are drawn from an unpublished document “LEGI Capital and Revenue Split” provided to 
the authors by the UK Department for Communities and Local Government. 
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businesses, with projects supporting new business start-ups receiving a similar share. Support to 
residents, e.g., in acquiring skills or a job, accounted for about 20% of expenditure, while about 
10% was spent on area improvements or promotion. Management and administration accounted for 
the remaining 10% of expenditure.  The majority of LAs put emphasis on business assistance with 
16 out of 20 LEGI areas targeting at least 50 percent of their total LEGI funding on businesses, 
while spending targeted to local residents accounted for a much smaller proportion in majority of 
support areas with its funding share being less than 25 percent in 15 areas (figure 2). 
In a 2010 evaluation, the government reported that LEGI had assisted or engaged 240,000 
individuals by December 2009 (around 17% of the working age population), created 19,500 jobs (a 
1.9% job creation rate from a baseline of around 1 million area jobs in 2006) and 13,700 new 
business (a 17% creation rate from a baseline of around 78,500 in 2006) (DCLG 2010a; DCLG 
2010b). The evaluation employs propensity score matching at LSOA level (based on observed area 
characteristics) which does not control for unobserved heterogeneity in local economic trends. As 
will become clear in our analysis below, ignoring such confounding variation across localities 
massively over-estimates the benefits from the programme. 
3 Data 
Our units of observation are so-called Lower Layer Super Output Areas, henceforth referred to as 
super output areas or LSOA. LSOA are small geographical areas used as the basis for the UK 
census.9 The boundaries of super output areas coincide with LA boundaries and they can be 
classified exactly as either treated or untreated on the basis of LEGI boundaries.  
Our three outcomes of interest – employment, number of businesses, and unemployment – 
correspond closely to the objectives of LEGI. Data on employment and number of business come 
from the Business Structure Database which provides an annual snapshot of the Inter-Departmental 
Business Register (IDBR). This dataset contains information on 2.1 million businesses, accounting 
9 LSOAs have a minimum population of 1,000. The 32,482 LSOAs in England were built from groups of Output Areas 
(OA) (typically 4 to 6) and constrained by the boundaries of the Standard Table wards used for 2001 Census outputs. 
2001 Census OAs were built from clusters of adjacent unit postcodes. They were designed to have similar population 
sizes and be as socially homogenous as possible (based on tenure of household and dwelling type). OAs preferably 
consisted entirely of urban postcodes or entirely of rural postcodes. They had approximately regular shapes and 
tended to be constrained by obvious boundaries such as major roads. The minimum OA size is 40 resident households 
and 100 resident persons but the recommended size was rather larger at 125 households. 
(http://www.ons.gov.uk/about-statistics/geography/products/geog-products-area/names-codes/soa/index.html and 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/census_geog.asp, accessed 27/06/2011) 
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for approximately 99% of economic activity in the UK and includes each business’ name, postcode 
and total employment. We use the Ordnance Survey Code-Point data set to match business 
postcodes to LSOA and then construct our measures of employment and number of businesses by 
aggregating the BSD data by LSOA. Unemployment data measures the number of benefit claimants 
aged 16-64 and is available at LSOA level from the Neighbourhood Statistics database maintained 
by the ONS.10 We also have data for area characteristics measuring acreage, measures of 
deprivation and economic activity and ethnic composition of residents at LSOA level provided by 
Neighbourhood Statistics.  
Geocoding of LSOA by treatment status is based on shape files provided by the UK Borders 
database. An LSOA is considered as treated if it is located within the boundaries of an LA receiving 
LEGI funding. Because LSOA are constructed so as not to cross any LA boundaries, the geocoding 
of treated LSOA is exact.  
We evaluate the impact of LEGI using data for the period 2002-2012 covering three years before, 
and eight years after, the announcement of LEGI in 2005. We use 2004 – the year before LEGI was 
announced – as the base-line year. As discussed above, the policy was announced in 2005, the first 
funding allocations were made in 2006 and the programme ran until March 2011. Thus the data 
window allows us to examine potential pre-treatment trends prior to the announcement, treatment 
effects in the programme period, and whether effects persist once the programme ends. We draw 
additional data from the 2001 census to control for pre-treatment area characteristics.  Descriptive 
statistics for the data are presented in Tables 1 and 2. In addition to levels, we present statistics for 
log changes for key outcomes for pre-treatment period 2002-2004 and for two different treatment 
periods: 2004-2009 and 2004-2012 (on which our empirical specifications are based). The way in 
which these statistics are presented relates to our empirical strategy and so we postpone further 
discussion of these tables until we have outlined the details of our approach (see section 5). 
4 Empirical Strategy and Identification 
In this section, we explain our empirical strategies for identifying the causal effects of LEGI 
funding on economic outcomes in local super output areas (LSOA) that are affected by treatment. 
10 www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk. Unemployment is measured as the count of Job Seeker Allowance claimants 
within an LSOA. To get Jobseeker's Allowance a job seeker must be available for, capable of and actively seeking work, 
aged 18 or over (except in some special cases) but below State Pension age, working less than 16 hours per week on 
average, and living in Great Britain. 
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In the conventional programme evaluation framework it is typically assumed that, in the absence of 
the programme, area outcomes of observably similar LSOA would be, on average, identical for 
treated and untreated units (this is the conditional independence assumption or CIA). A second key 
assumption for identifying the treatment effect of the programme is that the treatment did not affect 
outcomes for the control group (this is the single unit treatment value assumption or SUTVA). If 
these assumptions hold, average outcomes for untreated LSOA conditional on observable 
characteristics would provide an unbiased estimate of what would have happened to a treated LSOA 
in the absence of LEGI funding and we could identify the LEGI treatment effect by estimating the 
following equation:  
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝐿𝑟(𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,2004 is a log change in the outcome of interest between the baseline year 2004
and year 𝑡 in an LSOA 𝑖; 𝐿𝑟(𝑖) is a binary indicator for LEGI, equal to one if the LSOA is within a
Local Authority 𝑟, which was awarded LEGI funding, and zero otherwise.   
Equation (1) compares changes in the outcome between all treated and all untreated LSOA. A 
potential concern with this approach is that, to the extent that treatment is not assigned randomly (as 
is the case with LEGI), unobserved factors affecting the outcome may vary across treated and 
untreated locations, and this would invalidate the CIA. This concern has led many scholars to use 
nearby untreated locations as a control group (e.g. Neumark and Kolko 2010). This approach is 
based on the idea that if unobserved characteristics vary smoothly across space, the CIA is more 
likely to hold the smaller is the distance between treated and untreated locations (Duranton et al 
2011). A standard way to implement this idea empirically would be to introduce fixed effects for 
some appropriate set of spatial units that represented aggregations of similar LSOA. In line with this 
approach, we estimate: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛾𝐿𝑟(𝑖) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where Δy𝑖𝑡 and Lr(i) are as before and  α𝑙
   are a set of fixed effects defined as follows: For each
LEGI area we define a neighbourhood comprising all LSOA within the LEGI boundary (the treated 
area) and all LSOA outside the LEGI boundary but within 10 kilometre of the LEGI boundary (the 
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control area). We call these LEGI neighbourhoods. For the remaining LSOA that are located 
outside these LEGI neighbourhoods we assign fixed effects by LA. Identification of the impact of 
the programme now comes from comparisons within LEGI neighbourhoods between treated and 
untreated LSOA (i.e. LSOA inside the LEGI area versus LSOA outside, but close to the LEGI 
area). Although treatment status is invariant within LAs outside LEGI neighbourhoods, we keep 
them in the sample to allow comparability across specifications and improve precision of the 
estimated coefficients on pre-treatment area characteristics 𝑋𝑖 (these include ethnic composition and
economic activity of residents, acreage, and minimum IMD rank as defined below). 
Unfortunately, while the introduction of LEGI neighbourhood fixed effects may help with the CIA 
it may undermine validity of the SUTVA. For example, if economic agents in nearby treated and 
untreated locations compete in the same local markets and treatment affects the outcomes in the 
untreated areas as a result, decreasing the distance between the treatment and control group makes it 
more likely that treatment also affects the control group (i.e. SUTVA does not hold). Indeed, the 
concern that spillovers are stronger the closer control units are to the treatment area has led some 
scholars to drop nearest untreated locations from the control group (e.g. Kline and Moretti 2014). 
As we now explain, we use the fine spatial detail of our data to better address this trade-off between 
the CIA and SUTVA.  
Identifying Local Displacement Effects at Treatment Area Boundary 
In order to disentangle the extent to which the observed differences between treated and untreated 
LSOA are due to direct impacts of the program on treated LSOA as opposed to spillover effects on 
untreated LSOA, we divide treatment and control areas in to rings based on their distance to the 
boundary of the treated area.11  That is, we augment equation (2) with dummy variables for control 
and treatment rings that run parallel to the LEGI boundary: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑙
 + ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑇𝑖
𝑘6
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜉ℎ
 𝐶𝑖
ℎ10
ℎ=1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, (3) 
11 Gibbons et al (2011) use a similar approach to study the impact of government subsidised improvements to 
commercial building supply. The approach employed in our study develops this idea one step further and divides both 
control and treated areas in to rings based on the distance to the LEGI boundary. 
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where Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 and X𝑖 are as before; the 𝐶i
ℎ are a set of ten one-km-wide control ring dummies that take
value one if the distance from an untreated LSOA i to the nearest treated LSOA is between h-1 and 
h kilometres, and zero otherwise; and Ti
𝑘 are a set of six treatment ring dummies. Treatment rings
are constructed symmetrically for treated LSOA, although we pool all LSOA that are further than 
five kilometres from the nearest untreated LSOA because the number of observations quickly 
decreases when moving towards the centre of a LEGI area. More specifically, for k∈ {1, … ,5}, Ti
𝑘
take value one if the distance from a treated LSOA i to the nearest untreated LSOA is between k-1 
and k kilometres, while Ti
6 takes value one if the distance is more than five kilometres, and zero
otherwise. Including  α𝑙
   in the estimating equation means that ring indicators identify the spatial
pattern of the changes in the outcome of interest within LEGI neighbourhoods. Finally, as with 
equation (2), although treatment status is invariant within LAs outside LEGI neighbourhoods, and 
we do not assign LSOA within them to one-kilometre rings, we include them to allow 
comparability across specifications and to improve the precision of the estimated coefficients on 
pre-treatment controls (i.e. 𝛽). 
In equation (3), 𝜃𝑘 − 𝜉ℎ is the difference in the average (conditional) growth rate for the outcome of
interest between treatment ring k and control ring h. This difference identifies the treatment effect of 
LEGI if both CIA and SUTVA hold for the ring pair. As discussed above, if unobserved 
characteristics vary smoothly across space, the CIA will be more likely to hold the smaller is ℎ + 𝑘. 
However, spillovers in local markets are likely to increase as ℎ + 𝑘 is decreased. This implies that 
while comparisons between ring pairs are likely to be the least confounded by unobserved 
characteristics when ℎ = 1 and 𝑘 = 1, spillover effects are likely to be the largest for such pairs. 
On the other hand, local spillover effects are likely to diminish as ℎ + 𝑘 increases, but this will 
come at a cost of reducing the credibility of CIA. For example, consider the case where the program 
has a positive impact on treated areas at the expense of nearby control areas. If such displacement 
effects decay as we move away from the boundary, then 𝜉1 < 𝜉ℎ for some 1 < ℎ ≤ ℎ𝐵 where ℎ𝐵
refer to the last control ring within a buffer of comparable LSOA. Furthermore, we can consider a 
special case where the policy only has displacement effects close to the boundary. This may be the 
case if, for example, the only impact of the policy is to reallocate market shares across the treatment 
area boundary within localized markets. This implies an additional condition 𝜃𝑘 = 𝜉ℎ for some 1 <
𝑘 ≤ 𝑘𝐵 and 1 < ℎ ≤ ℎ𝐵. Testing displacement at the boundary may then be based on a null
12 
hypothesis 𝜃𝑘 = 𝜉ℎ for all 𝑘 ≤ 𝑘𝐵 and ℎ ≤ ℎ𝐵 against the alternative hypothesis 𝜃1 > 𝜉1.
12 In the
context of our study, it proves to be sufficient to set 𝑘𝐵 = ℎ𝐵 = 2. This test is based on very narrow
zones around the treatment area boundary within which unobserved characteristics that vary 
smoothly across space are likely to be sufficiently similar. We show below that pre-treatment trends 
in treatment and control areas within a reasonable distance of the treatment area boundary are 
similar, lending credibility to the CIA in the relevant subsample.  
Regression Discontinuity Design Based on the Minimum IMD Rank Rule 
Although our analysis is based on data at a very fine spatial scale as a result of which we can 
compare very nearby locations, exploiting variation across administrative boundaries may raise the 
concern that locations on different sides of the border, however closely located to each other, are 
exposed to different local policies. For example, if LAs that submitted successful bids were more 
capable of carrying out successful economic policies, economic performance in treated areas may 
have been better even in the absence of LEGI. In this case the CIA may not hold even for pairs of 
contiguous treatment and control areas.   
As argued in detail in Duranton et al (2011), this is unlikely to be a problem in our setting as LAs 
have a limited number of policy tools with which to affect local development. However, in order to 
assess the validity of this argument we consider whether non-random assignment of LAs to 
treatment is driving our results by exploiting the eligibility rule for LEGI funding that was based on 
pre-announcement deprivation rankings of LAs. According to this rule, an LA was eligible to apply 
for funding if it ranked among the 50 worst LAs against any of six LA level indices of deprivation 
in 2000 or 2004.13 Formally, this rule can be written as: 
𝐸𝑟(𝑖) = 𝐼(𝑅𝑟(𝑖) ≤ 50)
where 𝑅𝑟(𝑖) is LA 𝑟's minimum rank across the twelve deprivation indices (six indices for each of
the years 2000 and 2004) and 𝐸𝑟(𝑖) is a binary indicator taking the value of one if this minimum
rank is less than or equal to 50 which unambiguously determined eligibility for LEGI funding.  
12 In our statistical inference, we rely on a more conservative tests based on the alternative hypothesis 𝜃1 ≠ 𝜉1, that 
allows for the sign of the treatment effect (and hence also the sign of the displacement effect) to be unknown a priori. 
13 For details of this rule see section 2. For data and methodology for calculating LA-level IMD rankings see Appendix 
A. 
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Figure 3 displays the discontinuity of treatment intensity at the minimum rank cut-off of 50. Among 
eligible LAs below the cut-off the receipt of treatment was not completely determined by eligibility 
because constraints on the overall level of funding for LEGI meant that only 30 LAs out of 87 
eligible received LEGI funding. 29.4 percent of eligible LSOA are located within a treated LA 
while ineligible LSOA are never treated. The estimated change (standard error) in treatment 
intensity at the cut-off is 0.213 (0.010).  
Because the jump in the fraction of treated areas at the minimum rank cut-off is less than one we 
implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design (see e.g., Hahn et al 2001; Van der Klaauw 
2002) where we use eligibility as an instrument for treatment. The discontinuity at the threshold 
only provides one instrumental variable, which is insufficient for identification of all coefficients on 
treatment and control ring dummies in equation (3). Instead, we restrict attention to two subsamples 
of treated and untreated LSOA constructed on the basis of distance from the treatment area 
boundary, with distances selected on the basis of estimation results for equation (3) reported below. 
Specifically, we use (i) a sample of contiguous treatment and control rings located within 1km of 
the boundary and (ii) a sample of treatment and control rings that are 2-3km away from the 
treatment boundary (i.e. located further away and non-overlapping with the first sample).  
Separately for these samples, we estimate a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) procedure based on 
the following equations: 
𝐿𝑟(𝑖) = 𝛼1𝑠 + 𝜌𝑠𝐸𝑟(𝑖) + 𝛕1𝑠
′ 𝐑𝑟(𝑖)
𝑃 + 𝑣1𝑖𝑡𝑠 (4a) 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑠 + 𝜃𝑠𝐿𝑟(𝑖) + 𝛕2𝑠
′ 𝐑𝑟(𝑖)
𝑃 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑡𝑠 (4b) 
where s denotes the subsample and 𝐑𝑟(𝑖)
𝑃  is a vector of P polynomial terms of the minimum
deprivation rank. Here 𝜃𝑠 is the parameter of interest. For a subsample of one-km-wide treatment
and control rings that are between d and d-1 kilometres from the boundary, the estimate of 𝜃𝑠
recovers an effect corresponding to  𝜃𝑑 − 𝜉𝑑 in equation (3). It is worth remembering, however, that
if treatment effects are heterogeneous across LSOA, the RD procedure will recover the local 
average treatment effect (LATE) for the population at the cut-off, which need not be equivalent to 
the average treatment effect for all LSOA.14 However, as demonstrated in figure 3, none of the 
14 Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that when the effects of the treatment are heterogeneous the IV estimate of the 
treatment parameter is the LATE. Abadie (2003) provides conditions under which the TSLS estimator recovers the 
LATE when covariates are included in the model. 
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ineligible LSOA above the threshold are treated. This implies that the treated and the complier 
populations are equivalent and thus our estimation strategy recovers the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) at the cut-off. 
The key identifying assumption underlying the RD approach is that LAs did not manipulate their 
minimum deprivation ranking in order to receive LEGI funding. Although we cannot rule this out 
completely, it is highly unlikely for several reasons. First, we can rule out direct manipulation 
through false reporting because the deprivation ranks are constructed by central government on the 
basis of national statistics. Second, the timing rules out any manipulation of underlying socio-
economic characteristics in response to the announcement of the rules for LEGI funding because the 
deprivation rule was based on data pre-dating the announcement of the programme. Third, we can 
detect no abnormal bunching of observations at the deprivation rank cut-off of 50 (figure 4).15 It is 
possible, however, that LAs just above the threshold may have anticipated that future funding 
would depend on future deprivation rankings. This seems unlikely, but even if anticipated it is hard 
to see how this could affect our results because the minimum IMD rank is based on twelve indices 
with each, in turn, based on complicated formulas so that the outcome of any such manipulation on 
own IMD score would have been highly uncertain (see appendix A for details of data and 
calculations used to construct the IMD indices).  In addition, even in the unlikely event that a LA 
could control own scores on which the rankings are based, its final ranking also depends on the 
performance of other LAs which further decreases the ability to precisely manipulate one’s own 
ranking. In short, it is very unlikely that LAs manipulated own IMD scores to affect LEGI funding 
and inconceivable that they could affect their rankings.  
Before turning to results, a map helps clarify our identification strategy. Figure 5 shows 1km-wide 
treatment and control rings for the Croydon and Barking & Dagenham LEGI areas in London. The 
smallest areal units in the figure are the LSOA - our units of observation. LSOA labels indicate the 
relevant treatment or control ring within which the LSOA is located. For example, the label “T1” 
refers to the 1km treatment ring while the label “C1” refers to the 1km control ring. As discussed 
above, a LEGI neighbourhood comprises a LEGI area and a control area around it. The shaded 
LSOA are those within a 10km LEGI neighbourhood and are defined on the basis of the distance of 
15 Note that skewness towards the lower tail of the probability distribution is typical for a minimum of a random 
variable.  
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the LSOA to the nearest LEGI boundary.16 Estimation based on equation (1) excluding LEGI 
neighbourhood dummies compares average performance of LEGI LSOA to that of all untreated 
LSOA, while estimation of equation (2) including fixed effects compares average performance of 
treated and untreated LSOA within LEGI neighbourhoods. The shading identifies LSOA within 
different 1km-wide control rings. Our test of displacement based on equation (3) compares average 
performance of the nearest control rings to that of the control rings further away from the LEGI area 
boundary and to that of the treatment rings within LEGI area boundary within a given LEGI 
neighbourhood. As should be clear, the non-uniform size of both LEGI areas and individual super 
output areas introduces some unevenness in terms of the exact shape of the control rings. Finally, 
our RD approach is based on samples including (i) the 1km treatment rings and the 1km control 
rings contiguous to the LEGI boundary and (ii) 2-3km treatment rings and the 2-3km control rings.   
5 Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for outcomes and area characteristics for the full sample, 
treated and control areas. Comparing the second block of statistics to the third we see that, 
compared to the average control LSOA, treated LSOA start with smaller employment, fewer 
businesses, a larger unemployed population and a lower employment rate. This is hardly surprising 
as LEGI is specifically targeted at disadvantaged neighbourhoods. When we turn to changes in 
outcome variables, we see that LEGI areas do better in terms of changes to employment and 
number of businesses but worse in terms of unemployment over the period 2004-2009. However, 
when looking at longer-term changes from 2004 to 2012 (remembering that the programme was 
abolished in 2011), employment and number of business decline and unemployment increases in 
LEGI areas compared to the control areas. The growth in average employment is also slower in the 
treatment area in the pre-treatment period, while pre-trends between the treatment and control areas 
are very similar in terms of business and unemployment.  
The table also presents descriptive statistics for our set of control variables on population 
characteristics. As expected, there are some systematic differences between treated and control 
16 Technically we use the distance from a control (treatment) LSOA centroid to the nearest treatment (control) LSOA 
centroid to assign control (treatment) LSOAs to control (treatment) rings. In contrast to defining the distance on the 
basis of the LEGI boundary line, this has the advantage of ensuring that the average distance between locations in, 
say, a treated LSOA in the 1km treatment ring and an untreated LSOA in the 1km control ring is approximately 1km. 
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areas. In 2001, treated LSOA have, on average, a lower proportion of economically active, larger 
proportion of young unemployed, and higher proportion of long-term unemployed reflecting, again, 
the selection of economically distressed areas. Treated LSOA also have a larger population with 
white British ethnic background.  
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for outcomes and area characteristics for the three 1km-wide 
treatment and control rings nearest to the LEGI boundary. Comparison of  tables 1 and 2 shows that 
control ring LSOA within 1-3km of the LEGI boundary are more similar to the average treatment 
area LSOA than the average control LSOA in terms of pre-announcement employment and 
unemployment in 2004. This provides some initial support for the assumption that nearby LSOA 
are more similar in terms of these outcomes in the absence of treatment. Similarly, the difference in 
terms of number of businesses is considerably reduced when comparing treatment and control 
LSOA close to the LEGI boundary as opposed to the comparison to the average control LSOA. 
Note that, while the average employment trends over the period 2002-2004 are fairly similar across 
rings, 1km treatment and control rings diverge dramatically by the third full programme year 2009: 
Over the period 2004-2009 employment decreased in the 1km control ring by around 4%, on the 
average, while all other rings improved, with the largest increase in the 1km treatment ring (around 
10.6%, on the average).  Finally, differences across 1km control and treatment rings are much less 
pronounced in terms of unemployment and number of businesses. It is also worth noting that over a 
longer period 2004-2012 (ending after the programme was abolished) the differences between 1km 
control and treatment rings are, once again, small.   
These descriptive statistics are suggestive of two effects. First LEGI causes displacement at the 
programme area boundary. Second, these displacement effects appear not to persist post 
programme. We now turn to more rigorous econometric results that confirm and extend these 
findings. We start by presenting basic difference-in-difference estimates that compare all treated 
LSOA to all control LSOA and to control LSOA within 10km of the treatment area boundary. We 
then turn to our tests of differential change across 1km-wide control and treatment rings in terms of 
these variables. These regression approaches allow us to control for the observed differences across 
locations while maintaining the assumption that (conditional on observable characteristics) 
unobserved differences across treatment and control locations sufficiently close to the treatment 
area boundary are not confounding our estimates. Finally, we relax this assumption by exploiting 
the predetermined eligibility rule that induced exogenous variation in treatment at the minimum 
IMD rank cut-off of 50.     
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Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
Table 3 displays the results from specifications corresponding to equations (1) and (2) (i.e. without 
treatment and control ring dummies). It shows results for pre-trends between 2002 and 2004, 
treatment effects for changes between 2004 and 2009 (the third full year of the programme) and 
longer-term effects for changes between 2004 and 2012 (the year following the abolition of the 
programme in March 2011).17 The first column reports naïve estimates of the impact of the program 
from a pooled regression comparing treated and untreated LSOA (i.e. equation (1)). The second 
column adds area fixed effects, as discussed in section 4, to control for unobserved area-specific 
trends (i.e. equation 2 with no 𝑋𝑖).  The third column adds control variables for a rich set of area
characteristics, while the fourth column displays estimates for the same specification for the sample 
of LSOA that are in LAs that have a minimum IMD rank of 5 to 145, which is the sample used in 
the RD analysis below.  
In column 1, the naïve estimate is insignificant across all outcomes except for the 2002-2004 and 
2004-2012 change in unemployment. All coefficients are insignificant when conditioning on 10km 
neighbourhood fixed effects (column 2) and adding census controls for area characteristics (column 
3). Restricting estimation to the RD sample (column 4) has little impact on the estimates, except the 
coefficient for the 2002-2004 change in number of business becoming weakly significant.18 Overall, 
these results suggest that pre-treatment, during treatment and post-treatment, LEGI areas performed 
no better or worse than the control areas.   
Local Displacement Effects 
We now turn to the question of displacement across the LEGI boundary. Table 4 reports estimates 
for different time periods, for 1km-wide treatment and control rings, from specifications 
corresponding to equation (3). These results are for specifications including LEGI neighbourhood 
fixed effects and area controls, with the 1km control ring as the omitted category. As explained in 
section 4, the size of LEGI LAs limits us to using five 1km-wide rings and a residual 5km-plus ring 
for treated LSOA inside LEGI. For control areas we use ten 1km-wide rings. Results, available on 
17 For brevity, we display results for three periods. The choice of the period 2004-2009 is motivated by the fact that 
programme funding was at its highest levels in 2008 and 2009.  
18 Our more detailed difference-in-difference specifications and RD analysis below indicate that this is not driven by 
pre-policy divergence between treatment and control LSOA relevant for our displacement analysis. 
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request, are very similar for specifications excluding area controls as well as for the sample of 
LSOA that are in LAs that have a minimum IMD rank of 5 to 145 (the sample used in the RD 
analysis below). 
As for Table 3, table 4 shows results for pre-trends between 2002 and 2004, treatment effects for 
changes between 2004 and 2009, and longer-term effects for changes between 2004 and 2012. 
Results in column (1) show that pre-treatment trends in employment are similar across the 1km-
wide rings around the LEGI boundary, with no evidence of significant differences in employment 
growth before treatment. This stands in marked contrast to estimates for the period from 2004 to 
2009 reported in column (2) suggesting that employment grew significantly faster within the LEGI 
treatment area compared to the 1km control ring just outside it. If nearby treatment and control 
rings are comparable and treatment did not spill over to nearby untreated areas, comparisons 
between 1km treatment and control rings would provide an unconfounded estimate of the treatment 
effect of the programme. However, the control rings at 2km or greater also experience significantly 
higher employment growth in the treatment period compared to the 1km control ring, while 
differences in growth rates are much less pronounced between these control rings and any treatment 
ring. For example, the differential between the 1km treatment and 2km control rings is around 
0.152-0.103 = 0.049. Finally, our long data window allows us to examine the persistence of the 
employment effects after the programme was abolished in March 2011. Column (3) displays results 
for long-term changes from 2004 to 2012. It shows that the local displacement effects for 
employment do not persist after the programme is abolished. Over the 8 year period the treated 
LSOA grew no faster than the untreated control areas.  
To statistically test for displacement, we re-estimate the same specification, but with the 2km 
control ring as the omitted category. Figure 6 provides a graphical presentation of the results for 
employment which is the only outcome with statistically significant coefficients within 4km off the 
boundary (corresponding estimates and standard errors for all outcomes are reported in appendix 
table B1). When looking at a wide range of rings close to the LEGI boundary, the figure highlights 
the fact that compared to 2km control ring, employment grew the fastest in the 1km treated ring just 
inside the LEGI area. Moreover, it reveals dramatic, statistically significant divergence in 
employment trends at the boundary: employment growth was around 15 percentage points slower 
among treated LSOA 1km outside the treatment area as compared to treatment LSOA that are 1km 
inside it while we detect no significant differentials between the 2km control ring and any other 
treatment or control ring within 9km of the boundary at conventional confidence levels. In sum, the 
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results suggest that LEGI induced worse employment growth in untreated LSOA 1km from the 
boundary compared to all other LSOA in both the nearby control area and treatment area. They also 
suggest that 1km treatment ring improved employment the most compared to rings across a wide 
spatial range. Taken together, these results suggest displacement of employment from the 1km 
control ring with the largest spillovers within 1km of the LEGI boundary. 
Finally, going back to table 4, in contrast to these findings for employment, we are unable to detect 
any statistically significant displacement effects for number of business (columns (5) and (6)) and 
unemployment (column (8) and (9)). Looking at the pre-trends of these variables in columns (4) and 
(7), only the 5 and 6km control rings for number of business and 10km control and 5km plus 
treatment rings for unemployment show weakly significant coefficients, indicating, again, similar 
LSOA trends across a wide range of rings. For number of business, only the coefficient for the 8km 
control ring is significant for the 2004-2012 change. For unemployment, only the coefficient for the 
10km control ring is weakly significant for the 2004-2012 change.  
Overall, these findings indicate that LEGI funding resulted in the displacement of employment from 
untreated to treated areas. The pattern of point estimates also suggests that the displacement seems 
to be stronger the closer an untreated area is to the border of a LEGI area. Furthermore, we detect 
no impact on number of local units or unemployment when we compare outcomes for treated 
LSOA to neighbouring LSOA (controlling for observable characteristics). Taken at face value, the 
positive effect for employment combined with the insignificant effect for number of local units 
suggests that the displacement effect on employment we identified in table 4 is being created in 
existing rather than new firms. This is consistent with the fact that, in the UK, commercial rental 
contracts typically cover a five-year fixed term which implies sticky price adjustment and 
incomplete capitalization in the short-run for incumbent businesses (Crosby et al, 2003). As a result, 
an economic intervention supporting local businesses need not generate higher entry rates, as 
businesses entering the local market have to sign new contracts with rental rates potentially inflated 
by the intervention. The finding of no effect on unemployment, which is based on the residential 
rather than work location of a worker, is easy to reconcile with our findings of positive impacts on 
employment, once we recognise that local labour markets almost certainly cross LEGI boundaries 
so that workers who take the new jobs in the LEGI-side of the boundary may easily be from 
neighbouring untreated areas. The results also indicate that the spatial scope of job displacement is 
too narrow to generate any statistically detectable differences in employment trends at a more 
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aggregate level.19 Finally, we find no evidence that the effects on employment persist long beyond 
the abolition of the programme in March 2011. This suggests that LEGI appears to have created 
temporary employment displacement around the treatment boundary, but have induced no long run 
divergence in employment growth. 
Results Based on the Minimum IMD Rank Rule 
The variation exploited to estimate differences between treatment and control rings comes from 
between LA differences in LEGI funding. Although we compare rings within a relatively small 
area, the control and treatment rings are administrated by different LAs which may raise the 
concern that LAs which won a bid for LEGI funding may have been successful in attracting funding 
for other local development projects as well, or that they may have been more efficient in 
administrating their area in general. If this was the case, comparisons across the LA boundary may 
be confounded.  
We address the potential concern that more efficient LAs received treatment with the RD approach 
described in section 4. Given that the estimates in figure 6 suggest very local displacement of 
employment within 1km of the treatment area boundary, we calculate RD estimates for two 
samples: (i) a 1km boundary sample containing treated and untreated LSOA within 1km of the 
LEGI border and (ii) a sample containing LSOA within 2 and 3km treatment and control rings. We 
implement estimations with this pairwise approach because the minimum IMD rank rule has only 
one cut-off point (at 50) and thus it only allows us to estimate one treatment dummy coefficient at a 
time.20 We allow for first and second order polynomials of the minimum IMD rank and restrict the 
sample to a band around the cut-off. The width of the band is constrained by the limited number of 
observations in the subsamples. We use a band running from 5 to 145 as it drops the most deprived 
LAs from the sample, is symmetric around the cut-off (it includes all observations within 30 
percentile points of the cut-off), and retains enough observations to achieve statistical precision. To 
avoid overfitting with limited number of observations, we restrict estimation to models imposing 
equivalent functions of the running variable on both sides of the cut-off (that is, the coefficients on 
19 The 1km treatment ring accounted for around 3.1% of total employment in LEGI areas in 2004.  
20 Alternatively, we could interact all right-hand-side variables with a subsample dummy indicating each relevant ring 
pair, but this is equivalent to estimating the model separately for each subsample.  
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the first and second order terms of the minimum IMD rank are unchanged when crossing the cut-
off).21 
Table 5 displays IV estimates of the impact of LEGI on employment, net business creation, and 
unemployment for the different time periods labelled by the row panel titles. The IV specification 
uses a binary indicator for LSOA at or to the left of the cut-off of 50 as an instrument for LEGI 
treatment. All first-stage discontinuity estimates on the binary treatment indicator are highly 
significant and close to one (ranging from 0.894 to 1.170). Therefore, they and reduced form 
estimates are omitted for brevity. The first four columns show estimates based on a sample of 
treatment and control LSOA located within 0-1km from the treatment area boundary while the last 
four columns show estimates for LSOA within 1-3km from the boundary. Results for a 
specification using a first order polynomial of the minimum IMD rank are displayed in columns 1, 
2, 5, and 6, while columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 show results for a second order polynomial specification. 
In each even numbered column we control for the log level of the outcome in the baseline year in 
order to reduce sampling variation and improve the precision of the estimation (e.g. Lee and 
Lemieux 2010).  
The 2002-04 estimates suggest no evidence of differences in pre-treatment trends in terms of 
employment, number of businesses or unemployment. Looking at the effects up until the third full 
programme year 2009, consistent with figure 6, there is a robust and highly significant divergence 
for employment between the 0-1km control and treatment zones, and no statistically significant 
difference between the 1-3km treatment and control zones. The coefficients for the 0-1km treatment 
and control zones (between 0.358 and 0.425) are larger than the corresponding estimate in table 4 
(0.152), but the latter estimate is based on the full sample, and when the difference-in-difference 
estimation is restricted to a sample with the minimum IMD rank between 5 and 145, the difference 
is slightly smaller.22 Looking at the longer term effects up until 2012 (after the programme was 
abolished), the estimates for employment are insignificant and considerably smaller than for the 
2004-2009 changes across all specifications. Overall, these estimates suggest, again, displacement 
of employment at the treatment boundary, but these effects diminish quickly after the programme is 
abolished in March 2011.  
21 See Gelman and Imbens (2014) for a thorough discussion of unreliability of RD estimates in over-fitted settings. 
22 The corresponding difference-in-difference estimate (standard error) for the restricted sample is 0.188 (0.051).  
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The coefficients for the 2004-2009 change in number of business are smaller than the corresponding 
estimates for employment and have lower statistical significance, although estimates based on the 
second order specification are significant at the 5% level (columns 3 and 4). For the 1-3km zone, 
none of the estimates is significant. Estimates for number of business are insignificant for the longer 
time period 2004-2012, except one weakly significant coefficient in column 2. Finally, the results 
for unemployment indicate no significant differences in either 0-1km or 1-3km zones. 
Overall, we conclude that the RD results are consistent with the pattern of estimates reported in 
figure 6 which suggests displacement of employment at the treatment boundary and little, if any, 
persistence of effects after the programme is cancelled. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the impact of a large-scale area-based intervention that aimed to improve 
employment and productivity in the most deprived areas of the UK. We assess the causal impacts of 
the policy by exploiting high-resolution spatial data on employment, number of businesses and 
unemployment. We show that treated locations within 1km of the treatment area boundary 
performed substantially better in terms of employment when compared to control locations within 
1km of the boundary. However, this difference vanishes quickly when moving away from the 
boundary: we find no statistically distinguishable effects when comparing control locations 1-3km 
away from the boundary to treatment locations 1-3km away from the boundary. Moreover, we show 
that the local displacement effects diminish quickly after the programme is abolished. A regression 
discontinuity analysis based on a deprivation rank rule that determined eligibility to bid for program 
funding confirms the robustness of our difference-in-difference estimates to potential biases that 
may arise from the selection of treatment areas. 
Our analysis suggests weaker, if any, impacts on the number of businesses. This and our finding of 
significant local displacement of employment suggest that employment increased mainly at the 
intensive margin. We argue that this is in line with the fact that, in the UK, commercial rental 
contracts typically cover a five-year fixed term (Crosby et al, 2003) and incumbent companies with 
existing contracts gain competitive advantage from the intervention if entrants face higher rental 
rates. The results also suggest that unemployment, which is based on residential rather than work 
location, was unaffected consistent with the fact that the scale of the local labour market is larger 
than the narrow spatial range over which employment displacement occurs.  
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Our results indicate that improvements in employment in the treatment area are offset by worsening 
employment in nearby untreated areas with no overall effect on unemployment. They also suggest 
that the intervention was unlikely to have any positive impact on the treated economy in the long 
run. If the ultimate objective was to improve economic outcomes for residents then this represents a 
costly policy failure. 
The findings of the study are in line with the concern among economists that the direct impacts of 
economic interventions on a target population may well be attenuated by general equilibrium 
effects. Although we are unable to identify general equilibrium effects at a wider spatial scale 
(national or global, for example), our study makes an important contribution to the debate by 
showing that such effects seem to be at play at small spatial scales, within local markets. Moreover, 
our findings support the view that even relatively large place-based interventions may struggle to 
shift the economy into a new spatial equilibrium (so that effects persist post-funding). The findings 
are also important for future research as they imply that control groups constructed from untreated 
locations near to treatment areas, may significantly confound treatment effect estimates. In the 
context of this study such an approach would lead to a large overstatement of employment effects of 
the policy and badly misleading recommendations for policy makers. Our approach utilising 
detailed spatial data that allows us to consider the trade-off between CIA and SUTVA suggests one 
approach for addressing this problem.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status 
All Treated Controls 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Employment, 2004 684.14 2351.8 32476 606.57 2196.5 3791 694.39 2371.4 28685 
Unemployment, 2004 21.57 19.51 32476 28.06 21.89 3791 20.72 19.01 28685 
Number of businesses, 2004 64.9 217.15 32476 48.45 143.28 3791 67.07 225.02 28685 
Employment Density, 2004 1310 4304 32476 1118 2456 3791 1336 4491 28685 
Unemployment Density, 2004 75.87 130.15 32476 90.54 114.55 3791 73.94 131.96 28685 
Business Density, 2004 130.97 312.61 32476 104.31 401.19 3791 134.5 298.77 28685 
Employment, log change 2004-2009 0.039 0.447 32473 0.040 0.490 3791 0.038 0.441 28682 
Unemployment, log change 2004-2009 0.534 0.444 31461 0.562 0.397 3758 0.531 0.45 27703 
Number of businesses, log change 2004-2009 -0.002 0.238 32473 -0.005 0.27 3791 -0.002 0.234 28682 
Employment, log change 2004-2012 0.084 0.500 32474 0.069 0.553 3791 0.086 0.493 28683 
Unemployment, log change 2004-2012 0.656 0.507 31380 0 .745 0 .456 3758 0 644 0 .513 27622 
Number of businesses, log change 2004-2012 0.085 0.284 32474 0.074 0.325 3791 0.086 0.278 28683 
Employment, log change 2002-2004 0.066 0.386 32470 0.054 0.424 3791 0.067 0.381 28679 
Unemployment, log change 2002-2004 -0.033 0.425 31087 -0.032 0.390 3744 -0.033 0.430 27343 
Number of businesses, log change 2002-2004 0.047 0.184 32470 0.044 0.213 3791 0.047 0.180 28679 
Acreage, LSOA 4.094 13.58 32477 1.566 5.717 3791 4.428 14.26 28686 
Minimum IMD Rank 2004, LA (NRF Eligibility Rule) 81.42 60.99 32477 16.9 21.31 3791 89.95 59.40 28686 
Population Characteristics: 
Economic Activity (% of working-aged pop.), 2001: 
 Economically active  66.80 8.25 32477 62.76 9.02 3791 67.33 7.99 28686 
 Self-employed 8.265 3.972 32477 6.297 3.153 3791 8.525 3.996 28686 
 Young unemployed aged 16-24 24.88 10.39 32477 27.21 9.45 3791 24.57 10.47 28686 
 Long-Term Unemployed 27.86 10.89 32477 31.35 9.83 3791 27.40 10.94 28686 
 Full-time Students 2.525 1.653 32477 2.510 2.094 3791 2.527 1.585 28686 
Population by Ethnic Background (fraction of total pop.), 2001 
 White: Other White 0.027 0.038 32477 0.014 0.015 3791 0.028 0.039 28686 
 Black or Black British 0.023 0.057 32477 0.017 0.044 3791 0.024 0.059 28686 
 Asian or Asian British 0.045 0.106 32477 0.05 0.121 3791 0.044 0.103 28686 
 Chinese or Other Ethnic Group 0.009 0.014 32477 0.006 0.011 3791 0.009 0.014 28686 
 Mixed 0.013 0.013 32477 0.012 0.013 3791 0.013 0.013 28686 
 White: Irish 0.013 0.013 32477 0.010 0.010 3791 0.013 0.014 28686 
 White: British 0.871 0.176 32477 0.892 0.159 3791 0.868 0.177 28686 
Notes: Authors own calculations. Data on employment and number of business come from the Business Structure Database provided by the Secure Data Archive at Essex. All other variables 
come from the Neighbourhood Statistics database provided by the ONS except acreage which is based on LSOA boundary files drawn from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal. Variables are 
measured at the LSOA level. Aggregate employment rate is the ratio of aggregate employment to the sum of aggregate employment and unemployment. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by 1km-wide Control and Treatment Rings 
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
3km Control Ring 2km Control Ring 1km Control Ring 
Employment, 2004 519.68 912.41 638 507.66 1031.02 510 460.66 1080.92 189 
Unemployment, 2004 26 16.8 638 27.64 19.96 510 28.44 21.15 189 
Number of businesses, 2004 46.02 45.12 638 42.33 44.33 510 38.19 39.53 189 
Employment Density, 2004 987 1567 638 957 1804 510 1017 1875 189 
Unemployment Density, 2004 100.78 125.52 638 105.92 130.01 510 120.14 128.31 189 
Business Density, 2004 111.07 138.19 638 109.59 145.61 510 107.81 101.95 189 
Employment, log change 2004-2009 0.032 0.54 638 0.055 0.454 510 -0.040 0.659 189 
Unemployment, log change 2004-2009 0.522 0.398 631 0.498 0.399 503 0.505 0.401 188 
Number of businesses, log change 2004-2009 0.011 0.252 638 0.029 0.261 510 0.021 0.263 189 
Employment, log change 2004-2012 0.091 0.594 638 0.090 0.547 510 0.127 0.651 189 
Unemployment, log change 2004-2012 0.683 0.452 631 0.683 0.463 505 0.624 0.416 189 
Number of businesses, log change 2004-2012 0.133 0.304 638 0.161 0.335 510 0.187 0.339 189 
Employment, log change 2002-2004 0.044 0.402 638 0.026 0.441 510 0.025 0.452 189 
Unemployment, log change 2002-2004 -0.040 0.398 628 -0.006 0.362 500 0.014 0.399 185 
Number of businesses, log change 2002-2004 0.039 0.207 638 0.033 0.199 510 0.023 0.213 189 
3km Treatment Ring 2km Treatment Ring 1km Treatment Ring 
Employment, 2004 570.77 1570.50 596 671.54 2303.37 505 391.51 633.01 183 
Unemployment, 2004 27.56 21.26 596 28.14 18.91 505 29.67 16.47 183 
Number of businesses, 2004 42.01 58.48 596 49.00 118.80 505 35.28 36.26 183 
Employment Density, 2004 1149 3087 596 1092 2565 505 1045 1597 183 
Unemployment Density, 2004 87.42 99.18 596 91.07 106.44 505 118.34 120.56 183 
Business Density, 2004 94.38 124.72 596 97.58 140.03 505 113.00 136.65 183 
Employment, log change 2004-2009 0.040 0.470 596 0.015 0.464 505 0.106 0.550 183 
Unemployment, log change 2004-2009 0.539 0.409 591 0.566 0.378 502 0.519 0.314 182 
Number of businesses, log change 2004-2009 0.017 0.261 596 0.003 0.262 505 0.042 0.289 183 
Employment, log change 2004-2012 0.076 0.599 596 0.070 0.519 505 0.163 0.594 183 
Unemployment, log change 2004-2012 0.739 0.465 590 0.740 0.443 498 0.650 0.340 183 
Number of businesses, log change 2004-2012 0.088 0.345 596 0.126 0.336 505 0.230 0.398 183 
Employment, log change 2002-2004 0.089 0.398 596 0.063 0.417 505 0.035 0.43 183 
Unemployment, log change 2002-2004 -0.040 0.388 588 -0.030 0.362 501 -0.014 0.296 182 
Number of businesses, log change 2002-2004 0.055 0.221 596 0.048 0.235 505 0.009 0.242 183 
Notes: Authors own calculations. Data on employment and number of business come from the Business Structure Database provided by the Secure Data Archive at Essex. All other variables 
come from the Neighbourhood Statistics database provided by the ONS except acreage which is based on LSOA boundary files drawn from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal. Variables are 
measured at the LSOA level. 
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Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimates, All Treated vs. All Controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Employment, log change 2002-04 
LEGI -0.013 -0.001 -0.010 -0.010 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
N 32470 32470 32470 20431 
B. Employment, log change 2004-09 
LEGI 0.001 0.007 0.020 0.004 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
N 32473 32473 32473 20432 
C. Employment, log change 2004-12 
LEGI -0.017 0.006 0.019 0.002 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) 
N 32474 32474 32474 20433 
D. Number Business, log change 2002-04 
LEGI -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.020* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) 
N 32470 32470 32470 20431 
E. Number Business, log change 2004-09 
LEGI -0.003 0.005 0.008 -0.001 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) 
N 32473 32473 32473 20432 
F. Number Business, log change 2004-12 
LEGI -0.013 0.015 0.007 0.000 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) 
N 32474 32474 32474 20433 
G. Unemployment, log change 2002-04 
LEGI -0.059
*** 0.021 0.027 -0.002 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) 
N 31108 31108 31108 19977 
H. Unemployment, log change 2004-09 
LEGI -0.010 -0.040 -0.021 -0.012 
(0.033) (0.041) (0.048) (0.060) 
N 31472 31472 31472 20083 
I. Unemployment, log change 2004-12 
LEGI 0.101
*** 0.028 0.016 0.036 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.051) (0.058) 
N 31380 31380 31380 20054 
10km Treatment Neighbourhood Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-determined Characteristics Yes Yes 
Restricted Sample Yes 
Note: Panel labels refer to the outcome. Standard errors clustered at the level of 10km treatment 
neighbourhoods (program area plus 10km control buffer) in parentheses. Pre-determined characteristics are 
the log of LSOA acreage, minimum IMD rank, and variables listed under the labels “population 
characteristics” in table 1. These variables are included in the regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) 
(coefficients are not shown). Data on employment and number of business come from the Business 
Structure Database provided by the Secure Data Archive at Essex; All other variables come from the 
Neighbourhood Statistics database provided by the ONS except acreage which is based on LSOA boundary 
files drawn from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal. Variables are measured at the LSOA level. *, **, *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Estimates for Employment, Number Business and Unemployment 
1km Treatment Rings vs. 1km Control Rings 
Employment Number of business Unemployment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
2002-04 2004-09 2004-12 2002-04 2004-09 2004-12 2002-04 2004-09 2004-12 
Treated, >5km -0.016 0.123*** 0.038 0.013 0.001 -0.022 0.055
* -0.086 -0.088 
(0.031) (0.038) (0.043) (0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.031) (0.057) (0.063) 
Treated, 5km 0.008 0.083* 0.015 0.006 0.009 -0.016 0.030 -0.080 -0.041 
(0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.058) (0.059) 
Treated, 4km -0.016 0.133*** 0.035 0.013 0.011 -0.023 0.006 -0.051 -0.039 
(0.020) (0.038) (0.040) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.052) (0.064) 
Treated, 3km 0.022 0.110*** 0.030 0.014 0.023 -0.008 0.003 -0.046 -0.005 
(0.021) (0.039) (0.046) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016) (0.030) (0.056) (0.058) 
Treated, 2km 0.012 0.071* -0.006 0.012 -0.005 -0.006 0.021 -0.005 0.025 
(0.021) (0.041) (0.046) (0.028) (0.026) (0.020) (0.041) (0.076) (0.076) 
Treated, 1km -0.001 0.152*** 0.051 -0.022 0.022 0.045 0.053 -0.035 0.005 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.068) (0.025) (0.029) (0.045) (0.043) (0.086) (0.052) 
Control, 1km Reference Ring Category 
Control, 2km -0.017 0.103*** -0.011 0.005 0.015 0.008 0.009 0.003 -0.006 
(0.016) (0.032) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Control, 3km -0.007 0.083** -0.001 0.010 -0.001 -0.012 -0.028 0.003 -0.029 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.032) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.036) (0.039) 
Control, 4km -0.011 0.098*** 0.007 0.017 0.004 -0.023 -0.028 -0.018 -0.042 
(0.021) (0.031) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.044) (0.048) 
Control, 5km 0.020 0.059** -0.010 0.031* -0.012 -0.024 0.010 -0.049 -0.053 
(0.016) (0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.042) (0.050) 
Control, 6km 0.044** 0.108*** 0.020 0.032* -0.003 -0.029 0.018 -0.037 -0.072 
(0.019) (0.028) (0.025) (0.019) (0.011) (0.024) (0.017) (0.046) (0.058) 
Control, 7km 0.029 0.061** -0.012 0.027 -0.020 -0.035 -0.001 -0.043 -0.039 
(0.020) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.014) (0.024) (0.021) (0.047) (0.059) 
Control, 8km -0.000 0.067* -0.032 0.017 -0.008 -0.038*** 0.004 -0.040 -0.036 
(0.018) (0.037) (0.031) (0.021) (0.023) (0.011) (0.021) (0.055) (0.062) 
Control, 9km 0.011 0.132*** 0.046 0.026 0.010 -0.006 0.005 -0.083 -0.098 
(0.026) (0.038) (0.036) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.051) (0.067) 
Control, 10km 0.012 0.155*** 0.098*** 0.017 0.023 0.010 0.045
* -0.057 -0.103* 
(0.022) (0.039) (0.034) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.023) (0.049) (0.057) 
N 32470 32473 32474 32470 32473 32474 31108 31472 31380 
Note: In columns 1 to 3 outcome variable is log change in LSOA employment for time period indicated. Similarly for columns 4 
to 6 (log change in LSOA number of business units) and for columns 7 and 8 (log change in LSOA unemployment). Variable 
labels refer to 1km-wide treatment and control rings. For example, the label “Control, 1km” refer to LSOA with distance 0-1000m 
from the nearest treatment LSOA. Distances between LSOA are based on LSOA centroids. Standard errors clustered at the level 
of 10km treatment neighbourhoods (program area plus 10km control buffer) are in parentheses. All specifications control for 
10km treatment neighbourhood fixed effects and pre-determined characteristics, which are the log of LSOA acreage, minimum 
IMD rank, and variables listed under the label “population characteristics” in table 1 (coefficients are not shown). Data on 
employment and number of business come from the Business Structure Database provided by the Secure Data Archive at Essex; 
All other variables come from the Neighbourhood Statistics database provided by the ONS except acreage which is based on 
LSOA boundary files drawn from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal. Variables are measured at the LSOA level. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. 
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Table 5:  IV Estimates for Employment, Number Business, and Unemployment 
0-1km Treated vs. 0-1km Untreated 1-3km Treated vs. 1-3km Untreated 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Employment 
A. 2002-04 
LEGI -0.102 -0.104 -0.090 -0.090 0.082 0.080 0.085 0.084 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.065) 
B. 2004-09 
LEGI 0.394*** 0.358*** 0.425*** 0.392*** -0.036 -0.041 -0.028 -0.032 
(0.132) (0.122) (0.123) (0.090) (0.054) (0.052) (0.043) (0.044) 
C. 2004-12 
LEGI 0.111 0.073 0.151 0.116 -0.109 -0.108 -0.098 -0.096 
(0.153) (0.124) (0.146) (0.086) (0.091) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) 
N 279 279 279 279 1877 1877 1877 1877 
Number Business 
D. 2002-04 
LEGI -0.017 -0.027 -0.012 -0.023 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.006 
(0.044) (0.025) (0.047) (0.027) (0.034) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) 
E. 2004-09 
LEGI 0.049 0.054* 0.075** 0.082*** -0.065 -0.058 -0.072 -0.065 
(0.040) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.041) (0.040) (0.046) (0.042) 
F. 2004-12 
LEGI -0.181 -0.163* -0.132 -0.110 -0.119 -0.105 -0.133 -0.116 
(0.127) (0.099) (0.113) (0.100) (0.104) (0.096) (0.117) (0.103) 
N 279 279 279 279 1877 1877 1877 1877 
Unemployment 
G. 2002-04 
LEGI -0.129 -0.088 -0.112 -0.071 0.042 0.052 0.048 0.058 
(0.103) (0.077) (0.105) (0.061) (0.100) (0.093) (0.106) (0.099) 
H. 2004-09 
LEGI -0.060 -0.065 -0.077 -0.067 -0.062 -0.075 -0.025 -0.034 
(0.097) (0.096) (0.118) (0.104) (0.158) (0.143) (0.094) (0.083) 
I. 2004-12 
LEGI -0.087 -0.098 -0.098 -0.100 0.026 0.010 0.051 0.039 
(0.146) (0.144) (0.160) (0.157) (0.154) (0.138) (0.118) (0.105) 
N 261 261 261 261 1727 1727 1727 1727 
Polynomial Order  1st  1st 2nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 
Lagged Outcome Control     No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Fuzzy RD estimates using an indicator for observations left to the minimum IMD rank cut-off of 50 as an instrument for 
LEGI treatment. Standard errors are clustered by minimum IMD rank. Specifications in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 (3, 4, 7, and 8) 
include first (second) order polynomial terms for the minimum IMD rank. First-stage coefficients on the instrument ranging from 
0.821 to 1.252 are highly significant (not displayed). The outcomes are in log changes. Estimates in columns 1-4 (5-8) are based 
on a sample of treatment and control LSOA located within 0-1000m (1000-3000m) from the treatment area boundary.  The 
sample is restricted to a minimum IMD rank band 5-145. Specifications in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 control for the log-level of the 
outcome one year before the baseline (e.g. in the first row this is log of employment in 2001; in the second row it is log of 
employment in 2003). Data on employment and number of business come from the Business Structure Database provided by the 
Secure Data Archive at Essex; Data on unemployment come from the Neighbourhood Statistics database provided by the ONS. *, 
**, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.  
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Figure 1: Map of Local Enterprise Growth Initiative Areas in England 
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A. Funding Share to Businesses 
B. Funding Share to Residents 
Figure 2: Distribution of LEGI area Funding Share to Businesses and Residents 
Source: DCLG (2010b) 
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Figure 3: Discontinuity on LEGI at the Minimum IMD Rank Cut-Off 
Notes: The figure depicts the share of treated LAs by minimum IMD rank bins. The bin width is five ranks. The lines are fitted regression 
functions from an LA-level regression of LEGI treatment status on a first and second order polynomials of the minimum IMD rank and a dummy 
indicator equal to one to the left of and at the eligibility cut-off of 50, and zero elsewhere. Data on minimum IMD rank are drawn from the 
Neighbourhood Statistics database provided by the ONS. 
Figure 4: Histogram of the Minimum IMD Rank 
Notes: The figure shows counts of LAs by minimum IMD rank. The bin width is two ranks. Data drawn from the Neighbourhood Statistics 
database provided by the ONS. 
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Figure 5: 1km-wide control and treatment rings (Croydon and Barking & Dagenham) 
Notes: The figure depicts 1km-wide control and treatment LSOA rings in the Croydon and Barking and Dagenham areas. LSOA labels indicate 
the ring. For example, the 1km treatment ring is labelled “T1” and the 2km control ring is labelled “C2”. Distances based on LSOA centroids. 
For example, the centroid of a 1km control (treatment) ring LSOA is located in non-LEGI (LEGI) area and within 0-1000m from the nearest 
treatment (control) LSOA centroid. GIS data from Edina’s UK BORDERS portal.
BARKING & 
DAGENHAM 
CROYDON 
LEGI Area 
10km LEGI  
Neighbourhood 
37 
Figure 6: Displacement of Employment at the LEGI Boundary  
Notes: Difference-in-difference estimates by 1km-wide control and treatment rings from column 2 of table 4. The outcome is the 
log change in employment from 2004 to 2009. The reference category is the 2km control ring. For further details, see notes in 
table 4. Corresponding estimates and standard errors are reported in column 1 of appendix table B1. 
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APPENDIX A: Data and Methodology for Calculating LA-level Deprivation Ranks 
The LA-level indices on which eligibility for NRF and LEGI was based were constructed by the government 
as follows:23 
1. Calculation of LSOA-level sub-indices for different deprivation domains. In 2000, the deprivation
domains were i) income deprivation, ii) employment deprivation, iii) health deprivation and
disability, iv) housing deprivation, v) education, skills, and training deprivation, and vi) geographical
access to services. The 2004 sub-indices were calculated for domains i)-iv), vi), and two new
domains on crime and living environment deprivation. The sub-indices were based on 32 variables in
2000 and on 37 variables in 2004. The set of underlying variables had some overlap between the
years (9 exactly equivalent variables) but due to new domains introduced in the 2004 index and
numerous changes within continuing domains a substantial number of variables are different in the
2000 and 2004 indices (the 2004 index introduced 11 variables not used in the 2000 index, while 3
variables were excluded). The 2000 sub-indices were mainly based on data from 1996 to 1999,
although some variables dated back to the 1991 Census. The 2004 sub-indices were mainly based on
data from 2001-2002 with the exception that some geographical accessibility measures – such as
distance to the nearest post office – and crime measures, used data from 2003. In some domains the
underlying variables are not measured in the same units. In such cases the sub-indices are formed by
ranking and transforming to a normal distribution, or by factor analysis. Furthermore, before
calculating the sub-indices, many variables were transformed with a “shrinking” procedure which
shifted values towards the mean of the corresponding LA, with more shrinking for small LSOAs, on
the average.
2. Calculation of a single LSOA Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The sub-indices were combined
by ranking the sub-indices and then transforming the ranks to an exponential distribution. The single
LSOA index was calculated as a weighted average of the transformed sub-index ranks. The 2000 and
2004 indices used different weights. For example, the income and employment domains each had a
combined weight of 25% in 2000, while they had a weight of 22.5% in 2004.
3. Calculation of LA-level IMDs. Six LA-level IMDs were used:
a. Degree was the population weighted average of the LSOA IMD within an LA
b. Extent was the proportion of a district’s population living in LSOA which rank within the
most deprived 10 percent in the country.
c. Intensity was the average of LSOA IMD within the most deprived LSOAs in the LA that
contained 10 percent of the LA’s population
d. Income Scale was the sum of LSOA sub-index in the Income deprivation domain (number of
people experiencing “income deprivation” in the LA)
e. Work Scale was the sum of LSOA-level sub-index in the employment deprivation domain
(number of people experiencing “employment deprivation” in the LA)
In 2004, a sixth LA-level IMD was introduced. It was the population weighted average of the LSOA 
IMD rank. Eligibility for NRF, and therefore for LEGI, was determined by ranking LAs by each of 
the 2000 and 2004 LA-level IMDs. An LA that ranked among the 50 worst LAs along at least one 
IMD was eligible for LEGI funding. 
23 This appendix is based on DETR (2000) and DCLG (2006). 
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APPENDIX B: Additional Tables 
Table B1: Difference-in-Difference Estimates for 1km-Wide Rings 
Comparisons to 2km Control Ring (2004-09) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Employment Number 
Business 
Unemployment 
Treated, >5km 0.019 -0.013 -0.090** 
(0.029) (0.012) (0.042) 
Treated, 5km -0.020 -0.006 -0.084* 
(0.041) (0.014) (0.045) 
Treated, 4km 0.030 -0.004 -0.054 
(0.029) (0.018) (0.041) 
Treated, 3km 0.006 0.009 -0.049 
(0.028) (0.018) (0.046) 
Treated, 2km -0.033 -0.020 -0.008 
(0.035) (0.018) (0.064) 
Treated, 1km 0.048 0.007 -0.039 
(0.040) (0.025) (0.075) 
Control, 1km -0.103*** -0.015 -0.003 
(0.032) (0.018) (0.023) 
2km Control Ring Omitted 
Control, 3km -0.020 -0.016 0.000 
(0.027) (0.014) (0.026) 
Control, 4km -0.005 -0.011 -0.021 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.035) 
Control, 5km -0.044* -0.026*** -0.053* 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.030) 
Control, 6km 0.005 -0.018 -0.041 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.032) 
Control, 7km -0.043* -0.035** -0.046 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.035) 
Control, 8km -0.037 -0.023* -0.043 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.041) 
Control, 9km 0.029 -0.004 -0.086** 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.034) 
Control, 10km 0.052** 0.009 -0.060* 
(0.025) (0.012) (0.032) 
Intercept 0.003 0.337 -1.319*** 
(0.434) (0.269) (0.397) 
N 32473 32473 31472 
10km Treat. Neigh. FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-Determined Controls Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: See notes in table 4. Estimates in column (1) are plotted in figure 6. 
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